hedayat alavitabar; fatemeh ghassempour
Abstract
The problem of "personal identity" is among the problems that are applicable to the resurrection life as well as the earthly one. Because based on personal identity and its criteria it would, on the one hand, be determined whether a person who is now, for example, seventy years old is the same person ...
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The problem of "personal identity" is among the problems that are applicable to the resurrection life as well as the earthly one. Because based on personal identity and its criteria it would, on the one hand, be determined whether a person who is now, for example, seventy years old is the same person who was twenty years old fifty years ago, and it would, on the other hand, be known that whether or not the resurrected person is identical with the earthly one. Thinkers has introduced a variety of criteria for personal identity, of which one of the most important is "soul". But rejecting soul, as an immaterial substance, John Hick regards human being as a psychophysical unity and, as a result, "body" would be the criterion for personal identity. Taking bodily resurrection and reconstitution of body for granted, he demonstrates the identity between the resurrected and the earthly persons by showing that their bodies are identical. He, as mentioned above, means by "body" both the physical and psychological aspects of the human being which constitute a unity. Hick sets up three situations through which he tries to prove that though the body in the resurrection world is the "replica" of the earthly body, but nevertheless these two bodies and, therefore, these two persons are the same. Hick's view is criticized by philosophers such as Penelhum, Olding, Clarke, Audi and Flew, and he has replied to some of them.
